Issues in Modern Christology
(another
theology essay by textman)
- CONTENTS -
INTRODUCTION:
1. The
Scope & Style of 20th Century Christology
PART ONE:
METHOD, CONTENT, AND THE PROBLEM OF SOTERIOLOGY
2. The
Question Of Method
3. The
Role Of Anthropology
4. The
Place Of Soteriology
5. Resurrection
And Cross
PART TWO:
DEMYTHOLOGIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR INTELLIGIBILITY
6. The
Impact Of Philosophy
7. Bultmann's
Vision Of Jesus
8. Demythologization
Changes Course
9. Beyond
Intelligibility
PART THREE:
HISTORY AND CONTINUITY (From Carpenter To Cosmocrater)
10.
The New Quest
11.
The Problem Of Continuity
12.
Wherefore Art Thou, Continuity?
13.
The Need For Discontinuity
CONCLUSION:
14. Final Synthesis
WORKS CITED
INTRODUCTION:
1. The Scope &
Style Of 20th Century Christology
Perhaps the most pervasive theme within modern Christology is the problem of how to make Jesus Christ more understandable and relevant to the modern 'critical / skeptical mind' forged in the wake of the so-called Enlightenment (eg. Kant, Schleiermacher, etc). This is basically a matter of systematic apologetics: Can Christians still speak to the "enlightened" Western mind about Jesus in a reasonable and meaningful way? In the last two centuries the gradual spread of historical consciousness has radically transformed people's thinking about 'life, the universe, and everything'. Many think that science has "proved" that miracles are figments of the imagination (surely an unwarranted assumption), and that all previous world-views are grossly inadequate and irrelevant.As a result of all this, it is now generally recognized that the traditional dogmatic conceptions about Jesus Christ no longer fit our 'brave new world'. The consequences of this sad fact are extreme (to say the least). On the one hand, we see a resurgence of the fundamentalist mentality which rejects modern thought altogether, and adheres to scripture with a more or less blind faith. On the other hand, secularization (ie. Weber's irreligious rationalization) has so completely de-Christianized the West that it can now properly be called pagan! In this crisis situation, the need to rethink Jesus is no longer an option, but a necessity.
Contemporary Christology is also influenced by other powerful factors beyond Christianity. A modern and systematic Christology must grapple not only with philosophy, but also with history and science; for all of these collective efforts wrestle with the truth, and are thus relevant to the Christological enterprise. History deals with Jesus of Nazareth, and the Church history that followed in his wake. Philosophy is also well equipped to contribute much concerning Christ: "The ultimate and universal quality of the questions raised by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus demands that we accept help from philosophers" (O'C. 'What Say' p.20). Science provides the necessary foundations for an adequate understanding of our world; and theology should - ideally - combine all these elements to build a coherent account of Jesus Christ which harmonizes 'reality and reason' with revealed truth and church tradition.
Modern Christology is thus necessarily pluralistic in method and content, ecumenical in spirit and practice, and capable of almost infinite variations. It is an ongoing analytic and synthetic enterprise that beholds and proclaims Jesus Christ in the light of modern knowledge of the scriptures and the Cosmos. In order to spread the Good News effectively, it is important to make Jesus Christ intelligible to the skeptical modern-mind. "The most important task of Christology is ... to present the reasons for the confession of Jesus's divinity" (Pan 34). It does this by interpreting Jesus rationally and systematically, and proposing a consistent image, vision, and understanding of him that is both feasible and compelling to both Christians and non-Christians.
The five scholars discussed below represent the main stages of the ongoing dynamic development of 20th century Christology. The main themes that run through it are all conditioned by a renewed understanding of two great ideas: Being and Time. Of course, our five theologians understand these weighty concepts in different ways, and use these ideas in different ways, and so preach radically different visions about who and what Jesus Christ was and is.
In attempting to construct a tentative Christological synthesis out of the often conflicting ideas of our representative thinkers, it might be helpful to begin by noting that the various modern Christologies can be grouped in many different ways. One popular method is to distinguish between the 'high/descending' and the low/ascending' Christologies, depending on whether or not the emphasis is on the divinity or the humanity. [Actually, the distinction by way of basic orientation (ie. vertical or horizontal) is less confusing and more descriptive.] There is also the 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' distinction based upon the possibility of salvation for those outside the church, or on a positive or negative attitude toward other world religions.
Another useful way to classify christological thinking is by its soteriological content, such that a "functional" Christology is one that is determined by the dual theme of Redemption & Salvation. Using these handy labels we can see that the traditional scholastic Christology can be characterized as descending, exclusive, and both functional and metaphysical (ie. in its two parts). Our five major Christologists can now be classified thusly:
1. Bultmann: functional Kerygmatic Christology. Influenced by Heidegger, Schweitzer, and Wrede. Leading ideas are 'faith' (eg. as authentic existence), the hermeneutic method of demythologizing (ie. a method of biblical interpretation and exegesis), and the meaning of Jesus Christ for the believer. Vertical orientation.
2. Pannenberg: eschatological Christology. Influence by Hegel, Bultmann, and Barth. Leading ideas are history as revelation, the resurrection as historical fact, and Jesus Christ as the proleptic fulfillment of history (ie. Eternity and Revelation enter Time at the point of the Resurrection; hence a vertical orientation).
3. Moltmann: functional exemplar Christology. Theology of hope. 'The Way of Jesus Christ'. Leading ideas are Rabbi Jesus, 'the way' as the Christian response to the world, and a strong emphasis on the value and centrality of the Cross. Horizontal orientation.
4. Rahner: transcendental and evolutionary 'Christology of Quest'. Influenced by Kant, Heidegger, de Chardin. leading ideas are Incarnation as the total Christ event; anthropological and cosmic themes; anonymous Christians; and the so-called "supernatural existential". Horizontal orientation.
5. Balthasar: aesthetic and pastoral Christology. Influenced by Barth, von Speyr, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Church Fathers. Leading ideas are Trinity as love, Jesus Christ as Logos, Mystery and Beauty. Balthasar's theology is a good example of a modern vertical orientation (ie. it is intentional; in contrast to Pannenberg).
PART ONE: METHOD, CONTENT, AND THE PROBLEM OF SOTERIOLOGY
2. The Question Of Method
In modern Christology there is a close relation between method and content, such that an 'a posteriori' approach (ie. horizontal orientation) is a method that focuses on the historical process and events which led to the churches' faith and proclamation, although we also recognize (with Rahner) a corresponding theological movement from above. [This latter allows for the occasional insertion of a more vertical orientation, placed, as it were, "at right angles".] Our christological synthesis favors this method as the best way to ground Christology within the finite and empirical world. Thus history and anthropology are crucial ingredients for us. In this way our patchwork Christology can incorporate the methods and results of biblical scholarship and the 'new quest' while remaining open to revelation (thematic and unthematic), and various aspects of Balthasar's 'theological project'.Now Pannenberg's stated method is to work toward abstract theological concepts (eg. incarnation), all the while searching for the meaning of Jesus' personal history, the facts of which have "an intrinsic intelligibility". We accept Pannenberg's lead to this point, but tend to think that he does not let the 'facts as such' speak for themselves; but rather, he understands the 'revelational unity' and 'proleptic character' of Jesus from an idealistic view-point that focuses exclusively upon the Resurrection as the eschatological event. For Pannenberg, Jesus' became the Christ by earning his stripes 'en route', and hence the concept of the Incarnation (and the importance of the Cross) simply does not apply (or is fatally compromised). Moreover, Pannenberg's over-emphasis on history, time, and 'the end of the world' leads to strange interpretations of traditional theological concepts (such as 'eschatological salvation'). Pannenberg avoids a metaphysical theology by replacing it with a Hegelian-like philosophy of history.
Of the two concepts so important to 20th century Christology (ie. being and time), he places too much weight on Time, and too little on Being. Because of this, his Christology is fundamentally lopsided. On the other hand, the soteriologically-driven Christology of Bultmann all but neglects time and history to place the weight on being and existence; and so is lopsided the other way. Since ours is not a functional Christology, there is little in his work (or Moltmann's) that we can incorporate into our synthesis: the existential understanding of faith (and Pauline theology), the need for demythologization, the importance of the Way of the Cross, and so on, are more relevant to soteriology than to an ontological and historical Christology.
A balanced approach to modern Christology will include the best elements from the four main sources of knowledge about Jesus: dogma, scripture, experience, and history. Too much emphasis on any one of these areas risks a partial and biased view of Jesus Christ. Likewise, our general horizontal orientation must be balanced by the insights and perspectives of the vertical orientation. Pannenberg puts his finger on the main strength of this view with the observation that "Knowledge must always begin with the universal and abstract, and only at the end reach the concrete as the object to which all the previous, abstract approaches were ultimately directed" (Anthro 22). Thus Balthasar's Christology begins with the Logos, and his vertical orientation is a necessary complement to his platonic categories (ie. truth, beauty, etc). Here method and content are in good harmony.
For Balthasar, the Christ-event is ultimately an experience of transcendent glory: Jesus Christ is the appearance of God; God's glory in the flesh; THE Catholic (ie. the universal in the particular). The power of Balthasar's Christology comes, in large part, from the fact that he combines the best elements of Catholic tradition, existentialism, and pastoral theology into an effective and unified whole. [For example, the human categories which illuminate the mystery of Jesus are: full authority, poverty, abandonment.] While I do not agree with Balthasar that a strong emphasis on the Logos is the best way to BEGIN Christology, I heartily agree that the center of Christology must be reserved for the mystery of being, time, and love; for it is around these three "concrete" themes that we can best understand who and what Jesus is (ie. the Eternal Logos of God), and hence who and what we are as followers of the Lord.
3. The Role Of Anthropology
Thanks in part to the humanistic thrust of Schleiermacher's Christology, contemporary Christology is now highly involved with various areas of anthropological studies; particularly the philosophical types of anthropology (eg. existentialism in the case of Bultmann). This 'study of humankind' is, like philosophy, a natural ally of modern Christology: Jesus Christ reveals what human beings can become, and anthropology provides the main categories for approaching Jesus Christ in his concrete humanity. Anthropology is thus an important element in the thinking of both Rahner and Balthasar, though they have very different conceptions of its essential contribution. For Rahner, philosophical anthropology provides the basic foundations for his transcendental Christology; hence he can say that "Christology is the beginning and the end of anthropology" (McB 477).Balthasar, on the other hand, has a notion of philosophical anthropology based on the enigmatic nature of language. Because philosophy is supposedly unable to account for the phenomenon of language, Balthasar concludes, rather too abruptly, that language is a gift of the gods. In any case, Balthasar's philosophical anthropology is clearly subservient to his more general theology of the Word. The most basic fact here is that the thing which most distinguishes human from animal is language; but language is a human reality only through participation in the divine Logos. For Balthasar the "fundamental anthropological reality is the fact of being called into existence of by a Thou" (O'Do 49). Hence the first step in understanding human being is to recognize the fact that 'I am addressed, therefore I am'. Being thus addressed, the human is also called upon to respond, such that the I and Thou encounter each other through communication. In Christ we find both Word and Response in unity; and on the Cross the Word becomes the Deed (ie. an act of utter self-giving, an act of ultimate love).
The anthropologies of Bultmann, Rahner, and Balthasar approach Human Being from different directions, but are not mutually exclusive. In fact, if taken together, with the rough edges smoothed out, they present a well-rounded understanding of the human being as a creature of many levels and depths. Pannenberg is so struck by the ubiquitous influence of anthropology upon Christian thought, that he issued this warning to one and all: theologians "... must begin their reflection with a recognition of the fundamental importance of anthropology for all modern thought and for any present-day claim of universal validity for religious statements" (Anthro 16). We echo this sentiment and applaud the recognition that the universal nature and character of Christianity depends as much upon its view of humanity, as on its vision of deity
4. The Place Of Soteriology
Christology is the "theological interpretation of Jesus Christ, clarifying systematically who and what he is in himself" (O'C Int. Jesus xv). In other words, Christology is driven by ontological concerns. On the other hand, soteriology deals with the question: Who is Jesus Christ for me? It is "the doctrine of salvation; the systematic interpretation of Christ's saving work for human beings and the world" (O'C Int.Jesus xvi). So it is that one of the key problems in modern Christology is the proper place of the soteriological approach. Now a complete separation between Christology and soteriology is quite impossible, since the interest in salvation is what, in general, motivates the questions we ask about Jesus.The history of Christology itself shows this; where the major changes therein have "been determined by particular soteriological interests" (Pan 47). Indeed, the central notion of the tradition seems to be that "Christology is a function of a soteriology" (Tillich); but this notion is, at the very least, debatable. After all, every soteriological statement has implications for Christology and vice-versa; just as every functional Christology has an implicit ontological Christology, even when it deliberately avoids "metaphysical" questions.
Ever since Kant's deconstruction of metaphysics, theologians - careful to avoid too deep an involvement with the imaginary transcendent world - have tried to base their thinking upon more tangible realities (this is the essence of the quest for intelligibility). Schleiermacher built his Christology around the experience of salvation (Bultmann and Moltmann both follow a similar route). These Christologies focus less on Jesus himself than on his significance 'for us'. The result is that the latter determines the former. This method is both illogical and dangerous, for questions about Jesus himself (ie. his person and history) "must remain prior to all questions about his significance" (Pan 48).
Now soteriology is a logical consequence of Christology because a reasonable faith in salvation first requires a solid foundation on which to build. This suggests the method proper to any adequate Christology; namely, it must begin with (and constantly return to) the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. But this is only "possible on the presupposition that a soteriological meaning is inherent in Jesus' history" (Pan 49). Thus meaning and fact are not separate and distinct moments, but are bound up together, such that the soteriological, ethical, and theological interpretations flow naturally from the Christ-event.
Faith is based on the history of Jesus inasmuch as he shows himself to be the revelation of God, and as such has universal significance. [So for Pannenberg the meaning of universal history is contained, as in a nutshell, in the proleptic resurrection; that is, for him the truth about Jesus of Nazareth must be seen in the context of universal history wherein the Resurrection anticipates the end and goal of world history.] Christology is thus concerned to establish the truth of Christian confession by unpacking the intrinsic meaning of Jesus' life, work, and proclamation. The radically different Christologies of Rahner and Balthasar converge upon this point, but draw forth different consequences. For Rahner, it means that the whole of the Incarnation is itself salvific; and for Balthasar, it means that the universal significance of this particular life-history allows us to recognize Jesus Christ as "the Catholic" 'par excellence'.
5. Resurrection and Cross
In the first century, the theme of salvation was heavily weighted with apocalyptic and eschatological elements. Even today, eschatology is a major ingredient in the thinking of Bultmann, Pannenberg, and Moltmann. For Moltmann, Christology is "no more than the beginning of eschatology"; and eschatology is "always the consummation of Christology" (Way xiv). Now it is certainly true, as Pannenberg suggests, that the early Jewish-Christians saw the resurrection as proof of the imminent end of the world, but they were perhaps led astray by the general apocalyptic zeal of those times. Pannenberg's (and Moltmann's) attempt to rehabilitate the central role of eschatology in Christology seems equally misled, and contrary to reason; but it is certainly in keeping with the widespread tendency to interpret Jesus within the boundaries of the Jewish thinking and spirit of first century Palestine. However, such a methodology is bound to misunderstand Jesus; chiefly by overemphasizing the gap between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith.Pannenberg especially has a curious view of salvation. For him, it is "obtained when the destiny of man becomes identical with his present existence, when man is united in his present with his past and his future" (193). This implies a 'wholeness of life', being the fulfillment of humanity's ultimate destiny, but which cannot be fully realized until the resurrection from the dead. Pannenberg's eschatological salvation thus depends entirely upon the revelational event of Christ's Resurrection. The trouble with Pannenberg is not so much that he lays too much stress on the Resurrection, but rather that his understanding of it depends entirely upon the idea that it embodies the 'end of history'.
Now this view of the Resurrection is consistent with both the biblical view of Time, and his own revelational theology, and so we will carefully include this element in our synthesis; but not without adding that the Resurrection, precisely as historical event, has other meanings and implications. For example, it seems that the most powerful and immediate aspect of the Resurrection is not its proleptic character, nor its inauguration of the end of the world, nor even its vindication of Jesus' person and mission, but rather its most outstanding quality is that the Resurrection graphically demonstrates that love overcomes even death. Of course, our knowledge of, and faith in, the Resurrection event does not "prove" the reality of 'life-after-death' (except for the original eyewitnesses who met the Risen One face to face), but it does provide grounds for hope; not so much in immortality or eternal life as such, but rather in life itself as a whole.
Pannenberg's christological method is to begin with the humanity of Jesus, and to go on from there. To begin Christology within the incarnational framework (as Barth and Balthasar do), one assumes at once two serious handicaps: by beginning at the end, one has already adopted an anti-historical position; and one cannot escape from encouraging a mythological tone. It is Pannenberg's view (and ours) that the ultimate criterion of any Christology must be the historical Jesus himself. After all, God is revealed in and through history; hence the Resurrection is both a real event, and a revelation which establishes the authenticity and authority of Jesus' words and deeds. Pannenberg's 'from ahead' method, and his concern to keep soteriology in its place, meant that he had relatively little to say about the Cross.
Now this oversight was over-corrected by Moltmann, whose Christology focuses on the crucified Christ within the context of the whole history of human suffering. For Moltmann, the shift from hope in the future to a present concern with praxis and justice leads to a political theology of the Cross. Here the meaning of the crucified Christ is that God is now in solidarity with the godforsaken and oppressed womb. [But actually, God was in solidarity with such people long before the crucifixion; see Old Testament for details.] Moltmann's "Christology for pilgrims" is thus highly functional, such that Christology and christopraxis are inseparable.
This 'Way of Christ' Christology is a deliberate step away from the paradigm of the modern world (ie. subjectivity, materialism, etc), and the "modern metaphysics of transcendental subjectivity" which results from it. His "metaphysics of community, process, and relation" directs our attention to Christ's bodily nature as the "existential point of intersection between history and nature in human beings" (Mol 'Way' xvi). In any case, my synthesis would place the Cross somewhere between these extremes.
PART TWO: DEMYTHOLOGIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR INTELLIGIBILITY
6. The Impact Of Philosophy
Another important element in determining the scope and nature of the christological enterprise is the use, or not, of philosophy as its cohesive framework. Now philosophy has had a major role within Christology almost from the very beginning. [The most fruitful philosophical concept in this vein, even up to modern times, is that of the Logos; which already had a 600 year-long tradition within Greek thought when the prologue to John's Gospel was written.] Thanks to the powerful influence of Alexandria upon the early churches, neo-platonic thought became the favored adviser to most theologians (both East and West) up until the time of Thomas Aquinas. Today, philosophical pluralism directly impacts upon modern Christology.For example, Pannenberg and Kasper both make use of Hegelian terminology; Bultmann and Balthasar make use of Heideggerian categories (most importantly 'Being and Time'); and Rahner is much indebted to Kant (among others). A strong philosophical base is essential to modern Christology because a solid understanding of humanity, history, and Cosmos is fundamental to theology in general. Many modern theologians "attempt to recast Christology in the light of a philosophically analyzed view of human experience" (Tho 64). Hence Rahner uses a transcendental (and phenomenological) analysis of human experience; Pannenberg an evolutionary analysis of history; and Balthasar an analysis of aesthetic experience. This only goes to show that we cannot build up our knowledge of Jesus Christ in a vacuum (as it were).
Nowhere does philosophy play a larger role in Christology then in Bultmann's program of demythologization (which means 'reinterpreting the myth'). Demythologizing (ie. the program of radical re-interpretation) thus translates mythical language into existential language; not completely, however, for there remains a residue of analogical language that is also myth (according to Bultmann's own definition). Even so, it recaptures the original existential significance - objectified in the myth - and presents it in a non-mythical form. For example, Bultmann regards the Resurrection as a useful myth that expresses the significance of the Cross, such that the believer's atonement and surrender of self- sufficiency (ie. internalizing the Cross) leads to a new life of wholeness and authentic existence (ie. internalizing the Resurrection).
Now Bultmann accepted Schweitzer's negative conclusions about the 19th century Quest; in part, because he saw clearly that faith is not dependent upon the findings of historical research, and (in part) because the churches faith documents (ie. the NT) are (for him) far more concerned with myth than with fact. "For the Gospel-writers Jesus had become the central object of religious devotion" (O'C 'Int.Jesus' 36). Since this old world mythology is fundamentally incredible to our scientific age, the Christian message, to gain a hearing today, must be parted (or rescued) from its mythological form as it is found in the New Testament. God's truth lies hidden in the mythical language, and this truth must be restated and re-presented, if we wish to give back to the kerygma its lost biting edge. The key to this task of translation Bultmann finds in the existentialist understanding of human existence (eg. in Heidegger's 'Being & Time'). This is adequate to the job only because the truth concealed beneath the myth is a true understanding of human existence: Christian salvation is therefore intimately bound up with the believer's new self-understanding.
Here Christianity is (and ought to be) an existentialism concerned with concrete reality, rather than an over-elaborated ideological superstructure filled with myth, timeless ideas, and other fantastic notions having little or no basis in, or connection with, the daily realities of modern life. In order to make Jesus intelligible to the modern mind, it is necessary to purge the biblical vision of its mythological aspects so as to get to the vital core of its message, which is the Kerygma. It is the kerygma that mediates salvation, and challenges us to authentic existence. Bultmann's work unites soteriology and philosophy to produce a Christology oriented toward the individual believer.
7. Bultmann's Vision Of Jesus
For Bultmann, Jesus was prophet, rabbi, and exorcist. He also suggests that the titles Son of Man, Suffering Servant, and Messiah all stem from the early churches' high-Christology. And yet the prophetic rabbi identifies himself with the people (ie. the Jews/Israel) - which is (in part) what 'Son of Man' signifies - but never considers a gentile mission. [The author's view of this matter is that Jesus of Nazareth (near the crossroads of East and West via the Fertile Crescent) easily developed a highly cosmopolitan vision such that the Gentiles were never too far from his mind.] Bultmann also recognizes Jesus' uniqueness and genius when he says that Jesus, unlike all other rabbis, when he looks at scripture, "critically distinguishes the important from the unimportant, the essential from the indifferent" ('Theology of the NT' 16). Despite its shortcomings, the image of Jesus as the existentialist rabbi remains a largely valid one (pastorally, if not historically) and intelligible (ie. no myths) and relevant (ie. it emphasizes the primal importance of personal conversion).Bultmann demythologizes and distills Jesus' teachings down to three main points:
(1) The Kingdom of God is 'dawning'; the sign of this is Jesus' own presence, deeds, and message. "Now is the time of decision."
(2) The Demand of God. Jewish legalism gives more weight to the source of the laws than to the motivation behind any given command. The courts are there to deal with overt acts of lawbreaking, but God is concerned with "man's inner attitudes, his secret motivations, his desires and purposes" (Bow 48). Thus God requires a 'radical obedience': the demand for love.
(3) The individualization of God's relationship with humanity; which means that the Heavenly Father encounters the de-historized and de-institutionalized individual. This is because corporate institutions (ie. Church, Israel) cannot have a personal I-Thou relationship with God; only persons (ie. individuals) can encounter God 'face-to-face'.The Kingdom is indeed addressed to the individual person, as Bultmann maintains, but it does not stop there. It goes on to embrace body, nature, and world (as both Moltmann and Rahner maintain); Time, history, and process (as Pannenberg and Rahner maintain); the social, economic, and political dimensions of being human, in terms of a just and righteous social order (as Moltmann maintains); the realm of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful (as Balthasar maintains), but it does not stop there either. It goes on to embrace all that we are, and all that we shall be ...
Now historical science cannot say that Jesus had all this in mind, any more than it can say that he worked miracles and was resurrected. The horizontal dimension can only take us so far; at the border, only the vertical dimension allows us to travel into 'the far country'. As to the Kingdom, I think Jesus' conception of it was far more expansive than most scholars are willing to give him credit for. By making the Kingdom big enough to embrace the conceptions of all five scholars, we may in fact be on the right track. After all, Jesus is (as Balthasar says of God) "ever greater"; which means that he cannot validly be reduced to first century Jewish (or 20th century existential) categories.
8. Demythologization Changes Course
Most modern theologians recognize the need for some demythologization, but very few scholars are willing to reduce Jesus to the Kerygmatic Christ. Demythologization, in its widest meaning, indicates a new approach to the mysteries of Christian thought and life; one more in harmony with the critical realism and concrete practicality of the modern mind. Now this general approach presupposes the necessity of an honest and reciprocal dialogue between faith and culture; one which includes the best elements of each. In the search for an adequate Christology, various degrees of commingling will result. Near one end of the spectrum are Bultmann's heirs rejecting the concept of Incarnation, saying that for Jesus to be fully human no divinity can be included (ie. any 'plus' added to the 'man' necessarily compromises his humanity: 'man-plus' does NOT equal 'man'!).Of course, there is no arguing the logic of this position. We can only point out that here demythologizing means reducing Jesus to the 'merely human' by separating him from all hint of 'supernatural taint'. The great weakness here is that this approach effectively removes all elements of mystery, power, and glory (which the scriptures clearly testify to). When you take away all aura from the Son of Man it may make Jesus more intelligible to the so-called 'scientific-mind', but it also makes it that much harder to emphasize his 'absolute uniqueness' vis-a-vis the other outstanding 'paradigmatic individuals' (cf. K. Jaspers).
A more moderate approach to demythologization is represented by Karl Rahner, who generally avoids such mythologically weighty terms as 'Incarnation', but instead reinterprets the contents in ways that are more historically, scientifically, and philosophically plausible. For example, his Christology is based upon a philosophical anthropology which recognizes and incorporates an evolutionary structure and dynamism to elucidate the nature and goal of human life, and Jesus' role in this grand cosmic scheme. Here, human beings are fundamentally predisposed to accept grace (ie. divine self-communication), and Jesus is the highest instance of this general supernatural orientation toward God. Rahner's interpretation of God's two-fold involvement (ie. immanent and transcendent) with the world and human beings retains the necessary element of mystery, and yet presents all this in a language acceptable to the modern (or, at least, academic) mind.
A major problem with Rahner's Christology, however, is that it will not impress those with an aversion to any sort of Hegelian-like universal process whose ultimate goal is to merge matter and spirit into some fantastic ideal unity. An adequate Christology must certainly be based upon a comprehensive and holistic philosophy, which is both historically and scientifically aware, but it need not carry the idea of universal process to extremes (eg. the so-called 'omega-point').
Now Rahner's Christology - and, even more, his anthropology - is excellent; but only up to a point! He has gone a long way in making Jesus, and Christianity in general, both more intelligible and attractive to the Western world. His brand of demythologizing includes a serious view of the facts of evolution, a sober acceptance of the reality of other world religions, and so forth. He has explained Jesus' role as Mediator in terms of the supernatural existential and his sacramental significance. The 'Jesus of History' and the 'Christ of Faith' are, for him, one and the same; indeed, Jesus is the ultimate unity of humanity and divinity.
Moltmann's functional Christology focuses on the Cross, and brings out the soteriological implications therein. In this way he sought to make Jesus relevant and intelligible, and above all practice-able to the modern mind. Along more conservative lines, Balthasar has no explicit intention to demythologize anything, yet he is very much concerned with renewing the Church by making the faith more credible and pragmatic. This emphasis on a more pastoral outlook is in harmony with the Enlightenment's legacy of world-affirmation; it is also entirely consistent with Catholic tradition, and, moreover, shows that demythologization is not the only way of making Jesus more intelligible.
9. Beyond Intelligibility
This 'Quest for Intelligibility' - of which the quest for the historical Jesus is a large part - requires the careful use of the tools of demythologization, reductionism (in the sense of avoiding supernaturalism and dogmatism), and materialism (in the sense of natural laws and causality). In effect, this means that we should speak about Jesus in concrete terms if we wish to dialogue with the modern world. We can say that he was a prophet, healer, rabbi, carpenter, mystic, sage, revolutionary, reformer, liberator, and so forth; these terms are more meaningful today than the ambiguous 'Messiah' or 'Son of Man'. But this is not really a new problem at all; in the first century the Gentiles found the phrase 'Jesus is Lord' to be more meaningful of than the older 'Jesus is Messiah'.In any case, all of these names, as all of the various aspects of the Kingdom, rest on the kerygma, which challenges the human being to realize his or her identity in relation to God. As sons and daughters of the Heavenly Father we are all in a new and dynamic situation, in a new love-relationship, with all things. [It is hard to make this intelligible to skeptical, cynical, and hard-headed pagan types!] In concrete terms, this means that the believer embarks upon a spiritual journey or quest that involves all aspects of human life (mundane or not), and that this trip does not end with death. It seems to me that both Jesus and the Kingdom he preached are big enough to accommodate many of the insights of Bultmann, Pannenberg, Moltmann, Rahner, and Balthasar; and still have some maneuvering room left over for future insights and/or revelations.
PART THREE: HISTORY AND
CONTINUITY
- From Carpenter To
Cosmocrater -
10. The New Quest
The 20th century 'new quest' for the historical Jesus was initiated by those of Bultmann's colleagues who were less skeptical than he. It is a modern attempt to make Jesus Christ credible and intelligible for the modern West, and for all those with a critical-historical consciousness: "Historical studies indicate that the gospels are not historical biographies and seem to be a mixture of fact and fiction. This state of affairs raises questions for many thoughtful people, and the Jesus quest is a way of addressing these issues" (Tho 106). Thus the new quest also serves an apologetic and evangelical aim; its spreads "the good news of Jesus Christ".The New Quest also recognizes that Christian faith is firmly bound to history by an intimate and unbreakable bond. Even such theologically exalted faith- statements as the Nicene Creed have that their core assertions of historical fact: "He was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried". This meager historical remnant is enwrapped in Greek theology such that the resulting portrait looks very different from the humble rabbi from Nazareth. And so in this it seems we have two distinct objects: the glorified Christ of dogma here, and the humble carpenter of Galilee there. Now this distinction is both useful and necessary insofar as it helps us to bear in mind that faith-statements sometimes go well beyond the actual reality that inspired them; they go deep into the realm of mythology, and even beyond.
However, we should not lose sight of the fact that history and dogma and myth all refer ultimately to the same person; which is to say that in reality there are not two entities here, but only one. The seeming contrast results from the radically different points-of-view; both of which are valid: "Poetry, parable and legend ... can communicate more relevant truth than an historical report" (Kung, 'On Being a Christian', p.415). Even so, the historical approach within Christology is most likely the best way to fix whatever actual unity exists between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. The centrally important events of the Death and Resurrection establish the pivotal point of continuity between Jesus' former life and activities, and the origin and growth of the disciples' post-Easter faith.
In order for this to work, we must assume (along with Pannenberg) that the Resurrection is an actual historical event (ie. not some collective delusion or concocted fantasy). Now Bultmann flatly rejects this idea, and even Rahner shies away from it; but the very nature of the Easter faith, and the events that followed the Resurrection, lead us to suppose that something remarkable did indeed happen. [Rahner's explanation of what that 'something remarkable' actually was is perhaps the weakest link in his Christology.] Now the Resurrection-event is surely miraculous, mysterious, and unprecedented, but this unabashed supernaturalism is not enough to merit automatic rejection; despite its obvious lack of intelligibility. After all, if Christians jettison the Resurrection in the name of reason, or science, or what not, then "our faith is in vain" (St. Paul).
The new quest also shows that the major weakness of the classic Christology is that it largely ignores or bypasses the history of Jesus' ministry. This was due in part to an inadequate conception of 'being and time'; which meant an ahistorical and static view of the world and human nature. But the curious thing about Bultmann, Pannenberg, and Moltmann is that, despite their enlightened outlook, they too tend to overlook Jesus' earthly life. Bultmann justifies this position by claiming that we simply cannot recover the real Jesus: "... we can know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus" ('Jesus and Word' p.8).
Although he came to admit that the new quest did produce results, his emphasis remained upon the existential validity of the kerygma. Where Bultmann neglects the past, Pannenberg overemphasizes the future, and Jesus' proleptic nature, such that he "ignored the miracles and other prominent themes of Jesus' life" (O'C, 'What Say', p.9). As for Moltmann, in his 'Theology of Hope' he "passed over the ministry in almost total silence" (O'C, 'What Say', p.10). Our christological synthesis endorses the new quest, for it has much to contribute besides the basic critical function.
11. The Problem Of Continuity
One of the main concerns of modern Christology, arising from the various 'Quests', is the abrupt (and often unacknowledged) transition from the Jesus of History to the Christ of Faith; which is also the problem of Christian origins. This problem of the genesis of Christian faith is central to contemporary Christology because it sums up the major concerns and results of Christian thought since the Enlightenment. It also provides a good way of assessing the identity and mission of Jesus within the context of the social-religious movement that arose in his wake.Now the completely ahistorical perspective of the old-style Christology only broke down about two centuries ago when the new historical science of biblical-criticism became aware of a distinction between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. This was based on the 'discovery' that the full Christian faith in Jesus as Messiah, Lord, and Son of God came about only after his death and resurrection. The problem then became one of accounting for the continuity and discontinuity in Jesus' status, and what this implied about his person, function, constitution, etc.
Since the pre-Easter faith of the Twelve was shattered by the scandal of the Cross - graphically illustrated by Peter's threefold denial - it seems that there is a radical discontinuity between the rabbi from Nazareth and the Kerygmatic Christ. Indeed, for Bultmann, it is "the Christ of the Kerygma and not the person of the historical Jesus who is the object of faith" ('Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ', p.17). In any case, it was the discovery of the Death and Resurrection as the original starting point of the Christian faith that determined the course of modern Christology: Pannenberg emphasizes the Resurrection, while Moltmann focuses on the Cross. In Moltmann's estimate, the "point at which the history of Jesus and the proclamation of Christ coincide is the Cross". In short, Jesus' death and resurrection is the "central mystery around which everything takes shape" (O'C, 'Int.Jesus', p.32).
Biblical criticism has (in effect) changed the orientation of Christology away from the vertical categories of 'above' and 'below' to the horizontal categories of 'before' and 'after'. In doing so, it has brought Christology down to earth, more or less. Prior to this 90 degree shift in orientation, the general understanding of Jesus Christ was determined by a more deistic image of God, as fixed within the culture surrounding the theologians of Christendom. Today, however, both deity and humanity are better understood in the light of the mission and person of Jesus Christ, such that our image of God and human being is determined by the revelation of the Christ-event in its entirety.
12. Wherefore Art Thou, Continuity?
Once we grant that the distinction between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith is a valid one, both historically and theologically, then the problem becomes one of locating the focus of continuity. [However, we must also bear in mind that the "question of the vital continuity between the faith of the primitive church and 'Jesus of Nazareth' is something quite different from the question of the continuity between a scientifically based, historical Jesus figure and the aforesaid faith" (Sch 35).] This all important focal point cannot be Christian faith itself since this was the result of Easter (ie. Christian faith began as faith in the Risen One). Many theologians point to the three days encompassing the death and resurrection as the focal point, for it was the events of those few days that changed everything.But this will not do either, for a specific moment of history charged with salvific, eschatological, and apocalyptic importance inevitably becomes isolated and detached from what came before and continued after. Moreover, when we recall that no one actually witnessed the resurrection event itself, then we can see the danger involved in making these events bear such extreme weight. In short, events as such cannot act as the sole or prime medium of continuity; what is needed is something that remains essentially the same before, during, and after the death and resurrection, and this can only be the person of Jesus, who is the 'Crucified and Risen One'.
But we cannot leave the matter to rest here, for the unusual claims made by Christian faith about this person can only be false mythical accretions if their reference is to a human person; after all, the bestowal of divine qualities and attributes to any human being is sheer idolatry (as the first century Jews were so well aware). The continuity we seek can only exist in reference to a truly divine person; only then can Christian faith be justified, and Christian confession vindicated. Thus Balthasar's 'theological project' rightly maintains a strong vertical orientation by the uncompromising assertion and recognition that Jesus Christ is the divine person of the Logos before, during, and after the death and resurrection.
Now some theologians (eg. Schillebeeckx and MacQuarrie) think it self-evident that Jesus was a human person, else he could not be "a real man". But Balthasar rightly points out that his humanity is NOT thereby compromised: the concept - or rather, the reality - of Kenosis is the only thing that makes the ideas of Incarnation and the 'God-Man' even semi-intelligible (ie. the elements of paradox and mystery remain). The point I wish to make here is simply that to reduce Jesus to a "mere man", while it doubtless makes him more intelligible to the modern mind, is to place Christology in a highly untenable position.
Perhaps the most popular way of establishing the continuity between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith is to point to the implicit Christology lying behind Jesus' words and deeds during the course of his public ministry. More specifically, it is the claim to authority hidden, as it were, within his proclamation and work that justifies the seemingly exaggerated titles conferred upon Jesus Christ by the early Greek churches (eg. Cosmocrater). Even though the New Testament often refers to Jesus as prophet and Rabbi, these titles are not really appropriate; for (as Balthasar points out) his claim to authority goes far beyond what any prophet or rabbi would dare. Indeed, in forgiving sins willy-nilly he assumes the very authority of God. Therefore, "the continuity between Jesus and the apostolic kerygma consists in the fact that Jesus' community designated and brought to expression the claim of Jesus in the only way possible at that time by its confession of him as Messiah and Son of God" (Pan 57).
Bultmann's view of the development of Christian faith hinges upon the observation that the early Christian communities saw Jesus as a mythological figure. In the apocalyptic and eschatological ferment of the first century it is not hard to see why this should be so. The New Testament itself suggests this: the Christ myth is more apparent in Mark, whereas the later synoptics present more detailed (and theological) accounts of Jesus and his ministry. [This insight has led to the general conclusion that the Christology of the New Testament begins with the "post-existent" Jesus Christ.] It takes time for an elaborate mythology to develop, and as it does, it will be largely determined by the concerns then most active; in this case, the apocalyptic and eschatological concerns of the early Greek churches. Bultmann concludes that the gospels' mythology represents the thinking of the Church, rather than the mind of Jesus.I tend to agree with Bultmann's reasoning on this topic; it is not only feasible, but quite useful also. For example, it shows us why Schweitzer's interpretation of Jesus is insufficient; that is, he wrongly attributes to Jesus the ideas and concerns of the unwashed masses, as if Jesus could not possibly be different (in thought and being) from them. Oddly enough, many modern scholars tend to do likewise; including Bultmann and Pannenberg.
For Moltmann, the problem of the transition from the Jesus of History to the Christ of Faith is a minor thing. Of far more importance is the problem of the "path leading from the Jewish Jesus to the Christian Jesus, and the rediscovery of the Jewish Jesus in the Christian Jesus" (Way xvi). While this is undoubtedly an important project for Christology, I cannot help but feel that Moltmann's image of Jesus shares the same flaw as Bultmann's (and indeed of most modern visions of the Lord); namely, they cannot avoid the Enlightenment's tendency to equate intelligibility with reductionism and anti-supernaturalism. Hence, most modern portraits of Jesus are indeed "Jewish" in sum and substance; which is to say, that they deliberately limit Jesus to the categories we find in first century Judaism. For Moltmann, this means that we should view the Galilean rabbi according to messianic, apocalyptic, and eschatological categories only.
I think it is a distinct possibility that Jesus' own understanding of these categories (ie. their terms, images, symbols, etc) burst the bounds imposed by his less perceptive contemporaries, such that his own use of these ideas and symbols contain meanings and implications that will differ from the common mind! [This may be why Jesus shied away from the inflammatory 'Messiah', and preferred the more ambiguous 'Son of Man'.] Most modern thinkers seem to see Jesus as some naive, but clever, peasant-type who really did not think overmuch about what he was doing. What is obviously needed here is a far greater appreciation for Jesus' spiritual and religious genius, brilliance, and creativity. As the 'universal man' who is the revelation of God, Jesus was *in* the world but not *of* it!
That is, the meaning of his words and deeds, while they *can* be understood exclusively according to the categories of first-century Judaism, or those of the early churches' kerygma, nevertheless bursts the boundaries imposed by these artificial limits. In order to speak to people today, the incarnate Logos elevates Jesus of Nazareth above and beyond the specifics and particulars of first-century Palestine. In this sense, an element of discontinuity between Jesus and the world exists, such that the mystery and grace of the Incarnation can never be exhausted.
CONCLUSION:
14.
Final Synthesis
Since Christology is the central and most vital aspect of theology in general, it is, at one and the same time, both an act of faith, and an act of reason. The latter allows Christology to address its very important apologetic function; while the former means that Christology cannot arrive at faith - as to some sought-after goal - but rather must presuppose the faith-input right from the start. Our view is that Christology should begin with the 'real' Jesus of History who must logically be distinguished from the dogmatic Christ of the later episcopal councils. But having affirmed the necessity of this distinction, we must at once emphasize that this distinction does not necessarily imply a radical discontinuity between Jesus and Christ. In examining the sources of the New Testament traditions, Bultmann finds that the only thing that can be discovered about the real Jesus of History is that he was the prophet of Nazareth.Now this is saying quite a lot (in our opinion) - for the implications are weighty in their significance - yet Bultmann does not see it this way at all. For him, our lack of certain knowledge about Jesus implies a radical break between the prophet and the Christ of faith: "For Bultmann there is an absolute discontinuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith." And this "absolute discontinuity" means that "the life of Jesus ultimately has no real importance for Christianity" (Sheehan, p.22). But this conclusion strikes us as being wholly contrary to the spirit and values of the Faith, and so must be rejected absolutely.
In doing so, we see that the break between the prophet of Nazareth and the New Testament traditions is neither as absolute nor as drastic as our modern Christologists suppose. Indeed, the NT evidence shows a gradual (and even logical) development in the early believers' ideas about Jesus: prophet -> Son of Man -> Messiah (Christ) -> the Lord -> Logos -> Son of God. There is no evidence in the text themselves of any absolute discontinuity between any one of these items and its nearest neighbors. On the contrary, what we see in the above schematic is a gradual, and even natural, progression (or growth) based upon an inherent continuity between the former life of Jesus and the later faith of the early Greek churches.
Thus the "real" Jesus cannot simply be reduced to 'a mere man'; and so we recognize in him both the Son of Man and the Son of God. In other words, our Christology must assume from the start that Jesus Christ is both human and divine (ie. his divinity cannot be proved, only recognized and acknowledged).
Our christological synthesis draws heavily from the work of Karl Rahner, mainly because he - more than the others - meets our stringent requirements. And although Rahner hardly ever talked about the historical Jesus at all, we nevertheless welcome the following ideas from Rahner's Christology as the solid foundation of our own:
(1) The world and its history are evolving toward a unity of matter and spirit, which is the fullness of God's Kingdom.
(2) God is present to all people as the 'principle of growth' (ie. becoming fully human is a process of self-transcendence involving grace and faith).
(3) The fundamental reciprocity between matter and spirit - central to Rahner's evolutionary perspective - means that the movement of history peaks with the Word/flesh union in Jesus Christ. [Pannenburg places the pivotal moment in history at the Cross, rather than at the Incarnation as a whole.]
(4) The unity of history is thus focused on the whole Christ-event, because Jesus Christ embodies the destiny of humanity; (although in a different way than that suggested by Pannenberg).
(5) Jesus Christ is the "ultimate word of God to humankind" (McB 477).
We also recognize the reality of God's universal grace, and the general 'unthematic' revelation in cosmos and human history (eg. Jasper's axial age). Beyond this, there is also the particular and concrete revelation (ie. Spirit/Providence) within the history of Israel (based on the I-Thou relationship between God and human beings).But all this is just the initial ground-clearing. We further accept that the ultimate revelation of God's Word is to be found in the life, person, and ministry of Jesus Christ, such that the 'vertical' Incarnation is both a unique historical and spiritual reality wherein the entire Christ-event (ie. from conception to ascension) is an eternally mysterious and gracious revelation of divine love. Yet despite these rather large 'a priori' assumptions, we nevertheless urge a balanced and moderate approach that is flexible enough to consider alien views, yet able to resist unrealistic and erroneous ideas; be they old (eg. the apocalyptic expectation of the imminent end of the world) or new (eg. dogmas which exalt Mary to the detriment of her son).
The best way of making Jesus intelligible is to adopt a historical methodology that begins with Jesus' life, then follows the development of Christian faith and understanding through the death and resurrection to Paul, the gospels, the second century prophets and apologists, the Greek Fathers, Councils, and so on. But in order to get the full picture, we must also illuminate the horizontal dimension with the vertical. Now Rahner's system is the foundation of our christological synthesis, but it is not (or ought not) to be so inflexible that it cannot accommodate the best elements of Balthasar's work (eg. Trinity as a communion of love), as well as the fundamental insights of Pannenberg, and even a few functional elements (via Bultmann and Moltmann). Rahner's Christology proceeds along the horizontal dimension, but it could certainly use a good dose of Balthasar, introduced as needed. Now when we are faced with a 'monstrosity' such as Balthasar's 'theological project' (ie. vertical with a vengeance), it is not hard to see why some (eg. Moltmann) will run full tilt in the opposite direction. We must therefore resist both extremes if we are to pursue a reality-based Christology that does full justice to reason, experience, history, and the Christian traditions of the early Greek churches.
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